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Realigning the American Consumer
Bankruptcy System with the Goals of the
Fresh-Start Doctrine: A Global Comparative
Analysis
ASSAF LICHTASH∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Two decades ago, consumer bankruptcy had not yet assumed an
impactful role in most countries’ economies.1 In its nascent stages,
consumer bankruptcy was primarily practiced and developed in the
United States, the world leader in the use of consumer credit.2 In the
past two decades, consumer credit grew around the world and it served
as a nucleus for the growth of consumer bankruptcy.3 The proliferation
of credit card companies has extended the democratization of credit to
include consumers from around the globe, and has become a ubiquitous
practice.4 As a result of this unfettered global access to credit, the
relationship between consumers and money has fundamentally
changed.5
The increase of access to credit has led the consumer lifestyle to
become both strongly reliant on debt and more costly as people borrow
funds to purchase that which they cannot afford.6 For many individuals
today, life’s necessities, such as housing and education can only be

∗ J.D., Loyola Law School, 2012; B.A., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2008. I would like to
thank my wife, Charlene, for her love, support, and insight throughout the process of writing this
article.
1. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Ian
Ramsey, & William Whitford eds., 2003).
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id. at 2–5.
4. Id. at 2–3.
5. See Charles J. Tabb, Lessons From the Globalization of Consumer Bankruptcy, 30 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 763, 773 (2005).
6. Niemi-Kielsilainen, supra note 1, at 2–3; see JACOB S. ZIEGEL, COMPARATIVE
CONSUMER INSOLVENCY REGIMES: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 30–35 (2003).
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obtained through loans, which put a growing number of consumers at
risk of becoming over-indebted.7 As a result, many individuals find
themselves in precarious financial conditions where any unforeseen
turmoil could lead to insolvency.8
Liberal access to credit is often cited as the cause of the global
growth in consumer bankruptcy filings around the world.9 In the United
States alone, annual bankruptcy filings have soared to over 1.5 million
petitions in recent years.10 Legislatures have adopted different
approaches in response to the global explosion in bankruptcy filings.11
Although the approaches of the various states differ in their
implementation, they all strive to offer debtors a “fresh-start.”12 The
main tenet of the fresh-start doctrine is the desire to provide relief to
honest individuals, who by some misfortune have become insolvent.13
According to this doctrine, such individuals should be afforded the
opportunity to restart their financial lives, unencumbered by previous
debt.14 The most efficient and common way to offer a fresh-start is by
discharging most, or all, of the consumer’s pre-bankruptcy debt.15
A disagreement among policy-makers revolves around the scope
of discharge. Some scholars say that granting permissive access to
discharge encourages reckless financial behavior among consumers and
contributes to the climbing number of bankruptcies.16 Others claim that
barring access to discharge stifles entrepreneurship and hurts the middle

7. Niemi-Kielsilainen, supra note 1, at 3.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Kent Anderson, The Explosive Global Growth of Personal Insolvency and the
Concomitant Birth of the Study of Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy Consumer Bankruptcy in
Global Perspective, 42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 661, 667 (2004); Ronald J. Mann, Optimizing
Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 395, 402–04
(2006); see JASON J. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 99–100 (2007)
[hereinafter KILBORN, COMPARATIVE].
10. WILLIAM D. WARREN & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 507 (7th ed. 2006).
11. Id. at 51; Rafael Efrat, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy in Modern Day Israel, 7
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 555, 556 (1999) [hereinafter Efrat, Israel].
12. Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 571.
13. IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY 34 (1st ed. 1990).
14. Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 555; Mechele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness:
A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 144 (2008).
15. See WARREN, supra note 10, at 508; see also Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 558–59
(making a fresh-start option available promotes the efficient allocation of the risk of loss between
debtors and creditors).
16. See Todd J. Zywicki, Why So Many Bankruptcies and What To Do About It: An
Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Reform, 57 (George Mason Law & Econ. Ctr., Working Paper
No.
03-46,
2003)
[hereinafter
Zywicki,
Bankruptcy
Reform],
available
at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/03-46.pdf.
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class, who most rely on consumer credit.17 This dispute, between those
who wish to limit debtor access to discharge of debt and those who wish
to expand it, is the focus of the discussion here. The purpose of this
article is to revisit the balance built into the American bankruptcy
system vis-à-vis the availability of discharge, and to ultimately consider
a shift toward a new balance in consumer bankruptcy.
Part II of this article will briefly describe the goals of the freshstart doctrine. These goals will be the standard against which the rest of
the discussion about fresh-start legislation will be measured and will
guide the subsequent evaluation of various forms of this legislation.
Part III of this article will provide an overview of the formation of
current American bankruptcy laws, and the positions taken by those
who either oppose or support them. This part will introduce the tensions
and hurdles faced on the road to forming a more workable standard for
consumer bankruptcy in the United States.
Part IV of this article will discuss fresh-start legislation in England
and Wales, France, Germany, and Israel, and identify the various policy
tools used by lawmakers to both treat and prevent bankruptcies.
Part V of this article will apply the policy tools identified in Part
IV to the American bankruptcy system and will discuss the difference in
approaches to implementing the fresh-start doctrine. Finally, this part
will offer a new balance for discharge in the United States that will
better adhere to the goals of the fresh-start doctrine.
II. THE GOALS OF THE FRESH-START DOCTRINE
While policy-makers differ on the scope of the doctrine,18 all freshstart laws share the same core goals: treatment of existing overindebtedness, and prevention of future over-indebtedness.19 The first
goal of the fresh start doctrine is the principled need to provide
humanitarian relief, and treat over-indebted consumers.20 This goal is
divided into three requirements. The first requirement is the enactment
of a fair and efficient debt-forgiveness mechanism at the heart of the
consumer bankruptcy system.21 The second is that a country’s consumer
bankruptcy system allows debtors to keep certain items that are deemed

17. See generally Margaret Howard, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt, 17
BANKR. DEV. J. 425, 427 (2001).
18. See, e.g., Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 556.
19. Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 81, 82 (2002)
[hereinafter Efrat, Global Trends].
20. See Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 568–71.
21. Id. at 556.
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essential for their self-sufficiency and human dignity.22 Together, these
two requirements are guided by a humanitarian aspiration to aid overindebted individuals in repairing their financial lives.23 Finally, the third
requirement is that legislatures treat the underlying causes of the
debtor’s financial failure.24
The second goal of the fresh-start doctrine addresses the inevitable
cost of bankruptcy to society and attempts to discourage irresponsible
financial conduct.25 In an effort to prevent over-indebtedness the
doctrine identifies two parties to which the risk of loss can be allocated,
namely the debtor and the creditor.26 One theory is that the party who
can best prevent the risk of loss and efficiently insure against it should
bear the risk.27 Policy-makers differ, however, as to which of the two
parties have such capacity.28 Some contend that the debtors, in having
the power to make conscious decisions to incur debt, should bear the
risk of loss.29 Others maintain that creditors are better suited to bear this
risk, because they possess the ability to deny loans to unreliable
applicants, and they can ultimately afford the cost of faulty
investments.30
The two goals of the fresh-start doctrine are inversely related. A
pro-creditor approach posits that permissive access to discharge would
encourage debtors to incur dangerous and risky loans.31 Under this
approach, a prudent policy would limit debtors’ access to discharge.32
The pro-debtor approach, however, maintains that liberal access to
discharge would give creditors an incentive to avoid giving dangerous
loans.33 These two opposing views on the implementation of the freshstart doctrine define the gamut of varying global approaches to the
structure of bankruptcy systems.34 The next chapter will discuss where
the American Bankruptcy System is situated on this spectrum.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
See id. at 558.
Id. at 556.
See id. at 558–60.
Id. at 558–59.
See id. at 558.
Id. at 558–59.
Id.
See id. at 559.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 562–63.
Id. at 559–63.
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III. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States, much like its counterparts in Europe and
elsewhere, has suffered from a sharp increase in consumer bankruptcy
filings in recent decades, reaching 1.41 million filings in 2009.35
Striking the appropriate balance between the availability of and
limitations on relief has long vexed American policy-makers.36
Between the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and reforms
introduced in 2005, American bankruptcy law provided nearly
unfettered consumer access to debt discharge, also known as Chapter 7
bankruptcy.37 The Chapter 7 discharge mechanism, still available today,
requires debtors to submit all of their non-exempt property for
liquidation and distribution to creditors. In return, their entire unsecured
debt is expunged.38 As bankruptcy filings continued to rise throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, creditors, scholars, and politicians called for
reform.39
What followed was a deeply contentious discussion between procreditor and pro-debtor advocates.40 Pro-creditor advocates argued that
the cause of the uncontrolled rise in bankruptcies was abuse of
discharge by debtors.41 According to these advocates, many debtors
chose to discharge their entire debt, even when they were able to repay
some or all of it.42 On these grounds, pro-creditor advocates maintained
that consumer access to discharge should be strictly limited.43 Opposing
this theory, pro-debtor advocates claimed that the reason for the rise in
bankruptcies was not abuse, but rather strong consumer reliance on
credit.44 According to this theory, Chapter 7 bankruptcy served as a
35. Sara Murray, Personal Bankruptcy Filings Rising Fast, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126263231055415303.html. See Donna McKenzie Skene,
Consumer Bankruptcy Law Reform in Great Britain, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 477, 477 (2006)
(discussing a similar situation in the U.K.).
36. WARREN, supra note 10, at 507.
37. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Report of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission (1997); Title 11, Bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (1978); Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
38. WARREN, supra note 10, at 509.
39. Corinne Ball & Jacqueline B. Stuart, The Battle Over Bankruptcy Law for the New
Millennium, 55 BUS. L. J. 1487, 1487, 1489 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 16; Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of
the Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1540 (2005) [hereinafter Zywicki, Bankruptcy
Crisis].
42. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Crisis, supra note 41, at 1540.
43. See Zywicki, Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 16, at 57–60, 96.
44. Elizabeth
Warren,
The
Bankruptcy
Crisis,
73
IND.
L.
J. 1079, 1080 (1998).
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necessary safety net—especially to middle class consumers—and
limiting it would render consumers defenseless against the threat of
insolvency.45
The American battle over the future direction of consumer
bankruptcy was temporarily settled in 2005 with the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA).46 Creditors aggressively spearheaded and lobbied for the
BAPCPA on Capitol Hill.47 This legislation drastically restricted
consumer access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy by implementing a system
called the “means test,”48 by which the debtor was classified according
to his or her income. According to this test, any bankruptcy petitioner
whose household income is over the median in his or her state of
residence is subject to a rebuttable presumption of abuse.49 To rebut this
presumption, the petitioner must show that his or her disposable
household income50 does not exceed one hundred dollars each month.51
This rigid requirement prevents a large number of consumers from
getting a fresh-start from their over-indebtedness.52
Petitioners who are ineligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy under the
2005 legislation can enter a repayment program called Chapter 13
bankruptcy.53 Under Chapter 13 the court creates a three- to five-year
repayment plan, during which the debtor must repay some, or all, of his
or her debt.54 If the debtor fails to make timely payments, the court can
dismiss the petition and the debtor may be left without recourse.55 Prodebtor advocates do not view the Chapter 13 repayment plans as an
adequate alternative to Chapter 7 discharge, because they claim it falls
short of the basic goals of the fresh-start doctrine.56 According to
BAPCPA, debtors can keep their post-bankruptcy earnings only under
Chapter 7; under Chapter 13 such earnings are at least partially
45. WARREN, supra note 10, at 515–16.
46. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act §§ 201–34.
47. WARREN, supra note 10, at 507.
48. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 102(h); see Charles J.
Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 12–18
(2001).
49. WARREN, supra note 10, at 474; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2011).
50. “Disposable Income” is current monthly income less amounts reasonably necessary for
the maintenance or support of the debtor or dependents and less charitable contributions up to
fifteen percent of the debtor’s gross income. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2011).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
52. WARREN, supra note 10, at 517–18.
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
54. WARREN, supra note 10, at 539.
55. See id. at 539; 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(4) (2011).
56. WARREN, supra note 10, at 510.
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designated for repayment.57 In addition, time has shown that Chapter 13
repayment plans often fail and are difficult for courts to administer.58
Thus, the goals of the fresh-start doctrine are best advanced by Chapter
7 bankruptcy, which, under BAPCPA, is no longer available to a many
consumers.59
The aftermath of the BAPCPA led to intensified opposition by prodebtor advocates.60 According to a 2005 study, about half of all
bankruptcies in the United States were caused by large medical bills that
drove households into insolvency.61 This important finding discredited
BAPCPA supporters’ main premise that the rise of bankruptcy filings
was due to debtor abuse.62 With the advent of the 2008 financial crisis,
consumer demand for bankruptcy has continued to rise, and the voices
calling for reform have only intensified.63 Some scholars are calling for
the BAPCPA to be repealed and insist that such action by Congress
should be on the horizon.64
IV. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
While vigorous public debate was taking place in the United States
over consumer bankruptcy, legislatures across Europe and elsewhere
were dealing with a similar spike in bankruptcy filings.65 The
democratization of credit has now become a global phenomenon,
making consumers around the world ever more reliant on debt.66 Much
like the U.S. Congress, the legislatures of the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and Israel have all enacted fresh-start laws.67 The different
57. WARREN, supra note 10, at 36; 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2011).
58. See Ian Domowitz & Elie Tamer, Two Hundred Years of Bankruptcy: A Tale of
Legislation and Economic Fluctuations 36–37 (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript) (submitted
to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission).
59. WARREN, supra note 10, at 517–18.
60. See Thomas Evans et al., An Empirical Economic Analysis of the 2005
Bankruptcy Reforms, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 327, 327–28 (2008).
61. See David U. Himmelstein, et al., Marketwatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to
Bankruptcy,
HEALTH
AFF.
(Feb.
2,
2005),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/suppl/2005/01/28/hlthaff.w5.63.DC1.
62. See U.S. Gov. Accountability Office, Bankruptcy Reform: Value of Credit Counseling
Requirement Is Not Clear, GAO-07-203 (2007).
63. Renuka Rayasam, Tidal Wave of Foreclosures Will Force Bankruptcy Reform,
KIPLINGER
(Oct.
10,
2008),
http://www.kiplinger.com/businessresource/forecast/archive/Tidal_Wave_of_Foreclosures_Bring
s_Actions_081010.html.
64. Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 115, 120–21 (2009).
65. See Niemi-Kiesilainen, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
66. Id. at 3.
67. See infra Part IV.A–D.
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legislatures, however, have applied varying approaches to implementing
the fresh-start doctrine.68 This chapter will examine how these countries
treat over-indebtedness by providing debt relief to a growing number of
consumers, and how they prevent the rise of bankruptcy filings by
allocating the risk of loss to debtors and creditors.
A. England and Wales69
1. Treatment: Imposed Out-of-Court Settlements and Post-Bankruptcy
Contributions
Bankruptcy in England and Wales is governed by the Insolvency
Act of 1986, which was substantially amended by the Enterprise Act of
2002.70 The British bankruptcy system offers two tracks for relief: a
negotiated-repayment-plan track and a coercive-bankruptcy track.71
The goal of the negotiated repayment plan track is to have an
Individual Voluntary Agreement (IVA) reached between the debtor and
the creditor.72 Throughout this process, the debtor retains the services of
an Insolvency Practitioner.73 Together they devise a three- to five-year
repayment plan, which must be authorized by creditors holding at least
75 percent of the debtor’s unsecured claims.74 Although they were used
in approximately 40 percent of insolvency cases in 2006, IVA plans
often fail.75 As a result, debtors, who may incur expenses of up to
$24,000 in managing their IVAs,76 risk being left in worse financial
distress than before and without substantial relief in case of default.77

68. Id.
69. Although the Insolvency Act of 1986, and the subsequent Enterprise Act of 2002 apply
to all of Britain, the discussion here is limited to the parts of the code that govern England and
Wales, but not Northern Ireland and Scotland.
70. Insolvency Act of 1986, 1986, c. 45; Enterprise Act of 2002, 2002, c. 40; Donna
McKenzie Skene & Adrian Walters, Consumer Bankruptcy Law Reform in Scotland, England
and
Wales
4,
7
(July
2006)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(available
at
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/research/persdocs.htm).
71. Insolvency Act of 1986, 1986, c. 45, pt. VIII; KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at
88.
72. Ian Ramsey, Bankruptcy in Transition: The Case of England and Wales – The NeoLiberal Cuckoo in the European Bankruptcy Nest?, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 205, 211 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Ian Ramsey, William Whitford eds., 2003).
73. Id. at 217.
74. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 88.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 88–89.
77. Id at 89.
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The second form of relief offered by the Enterprise Act is
discharge.78 The majority of British debtors receive full discharge from
their unsecured debt as early as one year after the commencement of
bankruptcy.79 In order to qualify for full discharge, the debtor must
show an inability to repay the debt and pay costs of approximately
nineteen hundred dollars.80 An interesting feature of the English version
of discharge is its requirement that some debtors make contributions to
their discharged debt out of any surplus income for up to three years.81
The choice of who is required to pay is left to the discretion of the
Official Receiver, a government official who manages the bankruptcy
process in England and Wales.82 Surprisingly, as a result of this
provision, the percentage of English bankruptcy cases in which debtors
repaid at least a portion of their debt has doubled to nearly 20 percent of
all cases.83
2. Prevention: The “Third Way” Approach
The Enterprise Act of 2002 marks a significant reform in the
British insolvency system. This Act was inspired, to a large extent, by
the American spirit of entrepreneurialism and its place in the structure
of the American bankruptcy system.84 English legislators were drawn to
the “tailwind” the American bankruptcy system provided to
entrepreneurs through its lax approach to discharge in Chapter 7
bankruptcies.85 As a result, British legislators intended to legislate a new
approach to discharge that would bolster entrepreneurialism, and offer a
safety net to consumers who wish to engage in risk taking.86
This strategy emerged out of a political philosophy that
predominated the ruling British Labour Party at the time, the so-called
“Third Way.”87 The Third Way is a centrist methodology of policy
making, which addresses all facets of a problem by developing an
approach that reconciles right-wing economics with left-wing political

78. Enterprise Act of 2002, 2002, c. 40, pt. 10.
79. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 § 256 (Eng).
80. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 89.
81. Ramsey, supra note 72, at 218–22.
82. Id.
83. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 89.
84. Iain D.C. Ramsay, Functionalism and Political Economy in the Comparative Study of
Consumer Insolvency: An Unfinished Story from England to Wales, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
625, 646 (2006).
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 655.
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thought.88 Third Way policy makers in England believed that a careful
and thoughtful implementation of regulatory instruments could help
form a healthy consumer credit market, where both debtors and
creditors conduct themselves with financial responsibility.89
Such regulatory instruments range from better credit scoring and
new consumer credit rights, to self-regulation.90 This goal is detailed in
the U.K.’s Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) Plan to Tackling
Over-Indebtedness. It states:
Working with our partners in the credit industry, the voluntary sector
and consumer groups, the Government seeks to minimise the number
of people who become over-indebted and to improve the support and
processes for those who have fallen into unsustainable debt . . . Our
aim is to get to a position where consumers have the capability and
information they need to make informed decisions about borrowing
and where lenders make responsible decisions about whether and
91
how much credit to grant.

Currently, DTI produces annual reports that describe the steps
taken each year to ensure these goals are met.92 The reports focus on
various policies that, in concert, are believed to “put out the fire” of
over-indebtedness, without denying individuals the opportunity to enter
free enterprise and engage in responsible risk taking.93 These policies
include:
[D]evelopment of a national strategy for financial capability;
increases in affordable credit through development of credit unions
and alternative models of affordable credit; introduction of a
“stakeholder suite” of financial products to promote asset savings;
investigation of the role of interest rate ceilings; strengthening of
credit licensing and attacks on unfair lending practices; attack on
illegal money lending; improved data sharing to underpin
responsible lending decisions; increases in the funding of free and
available debt advice; alternative dispute resolution for debt disputes;
the improvement of insolvency with the introduction of a “no income

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Dep’t for Work & Pensions, Tackling Over-Indebtedness Action Plan 2004 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Tackling Over-Indebtedness], available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file18559.pdf.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Id. at 8–9.
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no asset” procedure; and finally, improvement in housing benefits
94
and the administration of council tax benefits.

Despite the steps taken by the legislature, the outcome of the
“Third Way” approach has yet to be seen. Between 2003 and the third
quarter of 2006, there was a steady climb in personal bankruptcies,
where the number of actual bankruptcies predominated compared with
IVAs.95 Since 2006, the number of bankruptcies has steadily declined,
with the portion of IVAs getting smaller each year and the portion of
actual bankruptcies remaining the same.96 Although more time is
required to determine its success, the English approach to prevention of
over-indebtedness introduces a unique model of government actions
extraneous to the bankruptcy system.
B. France
1. Treatment: A System of Gradation
Like the British system, the French insolvency system coerces
parties to engage in out-of-court negotiations prior to filing for
bankruptcy.97 In fact, the majority of insolvency cases in France are
resolved in out-of-court settlements and only 35 percent of cases are
reverted to the bankruptcy system.98 In contrast to the English
government, however, the French legislature has attempted to avoid the
use of discharge.99 The French insolvency system is designed to
gradually intervene between debtors and creditors.100 The level of
intervention is primarily guided by the status of the debtor; the more she
is indebted, the greater role the insolvency system plays.101 The level of
intervention is divided into three alternatives for relief, each of which
gives rise to certain powers of the insolvency system over the parties:
(i) “ordinary” forced renegotiation; (ii) “extraordinary” moratoria and
partial forced discharge; and (iii) personal recovery.102

94. Ramsay, supra note 84, at 654–55.
95. Skene, supra note 70, at 60–61 figs.1 & 1a.
96. Dep’t for Bus. Enterprise & Reg. Reform, Tackling Over-Indebtedness: Annual Report
2007 19 (2007), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file42700.pdf.
97. Maria Gerhardt, Consumer Bankruptcy Regimes and Credit Default in the US and
Europe A Comparative Study, CEPS Working Document No. 318, CENTER FOR EUR. POL’Y
STUD. 10 (July 2009), available at http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1887.pdf.
98. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 63.
99. See id. at 62–63.
100. Id. at 63.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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i. “Ordinary” forced-renegotiations
The “ordinary” forced-renegotiations alternative compels a
creditor who is unwilling to yield to a reasonable settlement offer to
enter renegotiations of the debt under the auspices of the insolvency
system.103 A commission whose role is to make a preliminary settlement
recommendation and facilitate communication between the parties
controls renegotiation.104 The process may last for a period of up to ten
years.105
The commission’s authority to impose measures is limited to
merely “ordinary” measures of relief, such as granting time extensions
for payments and reducing the interest owed.106 The commission may
order discharge of debt only where the mortgage on the debtor’s home
is higher than the value of the property itself.107 Out of the 35 percent of
insolvency cases whose out-of-court negotiations fail, one-third is
resolved by means of “ordinary” forced renegotiations.108 Accordingly,
80 percent of all insolvency cases in France are solved through either
independent out-of-court settlements or a mild, albeit coerced, courtdirected compromise.109
ii. “Extraordinary” moratoria and partial forced discharge
Despite the relative success of “ordinary” forced renegotiations,
this measure did not always prove sufficient.110 Some debtors who
consented to the court-imposed payment plan were not able to satisfy
their commitment to repay.111 It soon became clear to legislators that
“ordinary” forced renegotiations offered insufficient solutions.112 Some
debtors whose debt was too overwhelming were unable to follow
through on any settlement plan and required a more extensive form of
relief.113 In 1999, the French legislature took another step in the

103. Law No. 89-1010 of Dec. 31, 1989, J.O., Jan. 2, 1990 (Fr.); id. at 63–64.
104. Gerhardt, supra note 97, at 9–10.
105. Id. at 10.
106. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 64.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Jason Kilborn, La Responsabilisation De L’Economie: What the United States Can
Learn from the New French Law on Consumer Overindebtedness, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 619, 649
(2005) [hereinafter Kilborn, La Responsabilisation].
111. Id.
112. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 64.
113. Kilborn, La Responsabilisation, supra note 110, at 649–50.
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direction of liberalizing relief and expanded the commissions' authority
to undertake so-called “extraordinary” measures.114
In cases of heavy over-indebtedness, the commission's authority
becomes twofold. First, it may negotiate a settlement plan for a period
of up to ten years, but the debtors and creditors must approve the
settlement plan before it goes into effect.115 Second, at the end of the
commission-imposed settlement negotiation, the commission may
propose a moratorium to reexamine the debtor’s propensity to repay her
debt, and the possibility of reverting back to “ordinary” measures.116 If
the commission concludes that the debtor has not regained her ability to
repay her debts, the commission has the authority to discharge some or
all debt.117
Following the passage of this law, commissions began to
recommend some form of discharge to 18 percent of “extraordinary”
cases in 2001, and approximately 30 percent in 2003.118 This rate has
remained more or less the same since 2003.119 The French legislature
continued to expand its liberal approach to discharge, and passed
another law whose extent of discharge is similar to that of the United
States’ Chapter 7.120
iii. Personal recovery
In 2004, the French legislature passed a law that offers full and
immediate discharge to debtors whose insolvency is deemed
“irremediable.”121 This law requires debtors to undergo a simplified
“procedure of personal recovery.”122 Since its establishment in 2004, the
number of debtors seeking “personal recovery” has doubled from
16,321 to 33,378 in 2008.123 Procedurally, this law is similar to Chapter
7 bankruptcy because it requires debtors’ assets to be turned over to a
trustee or liquidator, liquidated, and distributed prior to discharge.124
The difference between the French law and Chapter 7, however, is that
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the French system reserves this extreme form of relief for only the most
heavily indebted petitioners.125
Since the adoption of the personal recovery law, the number of
petitioners seeking personal recovery has soared.126 In 2006,
approximately 25 percent of all cases were diverted to the personal
recovery procedure.127 While the number of personal bankruptcies
seeking personal recovery has significantly grown, this growth seems to
have moderated in recent years.128
2. Prevention: Responsibility as a Two Way Street
Traditionally, the French insolvency system has placed the cost of
bankruptcy on debtors, demanding that they settle and repay their
loans.129 This requirement, along with the legislature’s original shunning
of discharge, has led consumers to take conservative risks.130 While the
number of cases that settled amicably was almost an astounding 70
percent between 1998 and 2003, French legislators began to recognize a
need to offer greater access to discharge.131 By passing the liberalizing
laws described above, the French legislature expanded access to
discharge.132 Concomitant to liberalizing its discharge laws, however,
the French legislature demanded accountability on the side of creditors
as well.133 The French approach to prevention of over-indebtedness is
founded on the concept of “responsibility as a two way street,” meaning
both debtors and creditors must bear the risk of loss created by reckless
financial behavior.134
By enacting a credit rating system similar to that of the US, the
French insolvency system views less favorably creditors who recklessly
extend loans to debtors with poor credit, and makes creditors bear their
share of the responsibility for consumer over-indebtedness.135 According
to this law, the commission will determine what relief should become
available, while “[taking] into account the knowledge of the debtor’s
debt situation that each creditor might have had at the time of execution
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of the different contracts.”136 The commission “may also verify that the
contract was entered into with the seriousness imposed by standards of
professional practice.”137 This approach puts a heavy burden on
creditors, particularly those who extend credit to overextended
debtors.138
An additional method of holding creditors responsible is the socalled “Stick Behind the Door” method, which refers to a requirement
for creditors to engage in voluntary, and then possibly involuntary
settlement negotiations.139 If creditors refuse to compromise with a
debtor who is ready to negotiate, the court can penalize the creditors by
granting the debtor a discharge.140 This practice gives debtors some
leverage in negotiations, and makes creditors more willing to settle.141
Although the last decade has seen a significant increase in the
number of annual bankruptcy filings in France, it seems that France’s
liberal legislation did have a moderating effect. After the first
liberalizing laws were passed in the early 1990s, France witnessed a
decrease in the number of bankruptcy filings.142 By 1996, however, the
number of filings increased again, to approximately 95,000 in 1997.143
By 2000, bankruptcy filings rose to 150,000 filings per year.144 This
upward trend continued through 2003, when France witnessed a surge
in personal bankruptcies.145 The subsequent liberalizing laws, passed the
same year, were followed by relative stagnation in France’s annual rate
of filings.146 One possible explanation for this slowdown is that the
liberalization of the insolvency system, while risky, offered overindebted consumers a fresh-start without opening the floodgates to
uncontrollable filings and possible consumer abuse.147
France has taken a cautious approach, and has chosen to enact
liberalizing laws over an extended period of time. Each law was
carefully crafted to put the burdens created by bankruptcy on both
debtors and creditors, and at the same time, moderated government
136.
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intervention where the parties could settle out-of-court.148 As a result,
the rise of bankruptcy filings in France, while initially sharp, is now
controlled, although a rise in unemployment is expected to increase the
number of insolvencies as well.149
C. Germany
1. Treatment: A “Period of Good Behavior”
Compared to its European counterparts, the German insolvency
system employs a unique approach to the treatment of over-indebted
consumers.150 The purpose of its approach is to bridge the gap between
the need of debtors to obtain discharge and the need of creditors to
moderate consumer access to it, and have debtors repay their debts.151
Similar to the English and French systems, the German system requires
the parties to attempt out-of-court settlements.152 As with the French
insolvency system, if out-of-court negotiations fail, the court tries to
impose in-court negotiations.153 The uniqueness of the German system,
however, surfaces when the parties fail to reach an agreement under
coerced negotiations. Following such failure, the court requires debtors
to formally turnover all nonexempt, work-related income to a trustee.154
The trustee is required to annually distribute portions of the funds to
creditors.155 At the end of a six-year period, the court discharges most
remaining debt, so long as the debtor has shown “good behavior” and
adhered to the conditions and requirements of the plan.156
The German legislature realized that imposing a six-year period of
strict prerequisites on debtors is a daunting task that might lead them to
default.157 In order to help the debtors maintain the required “good
behavior,” the legislature enacted a series of periodical incentives that
help debtors endure the six-year plan.158 At the end of the fourth year the
trustee refunds debtors a sum equal to 10 percent of any non-exempt
148. Id. at 9–10.
149. Gerhardt, supra note 97, at 11.
150. Gerhardt, supra note 97, at 8–9.
151. Id. at 8.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Jason Kilborn, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief:
Revolutionary Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States, 24 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 257, 279 (2004) [hereinafter Kilborn, German Approach].
155. Id.
156. Id. at 279–80.
157. Id. at 283–85.
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income collected during the year.159 The refund increases to 15 percent
in the fifth year, and the discharge at the end of the sixth year is
considered the ultimate incentive.160 Another innovation of the German
legislature is its requirement that debtors maintain “reasonable
employment.”161 Failure to do so gives creditors the right to seek a
denial of discharge. 162
Based on the rigidity of these provisions, the German legislature
did not intend to give discharge-seeking debtors an easy time.163 The
policy behind this rather grueling six-year plan is a German perception
that a discharge of debt is an extraordinary “privilege” that must be
earned.164 The legislation also functions as a protective measure against
frivolous and abusive petitions by debtors, which leads to the discussion
on the Germany’s approach to prevention of future bankruptcies.165
2. Prevention: Keeping Bankruptcy Unpleasant to Debtors
The idea of discharge took time to settle in Germany.166 Even when
discharge was finally made into law, the German legislature largely
avoided the permissive Chapter 7 model of discharge.167
Likewise, even the most socially-minded members of parliament
disapproved of the concept of granting a “get-out-of-jail-free” card to
German consumers.168
By mandating a series of negotiations and imposing a six-year
period of “good behavior,” the German legislature intentionally
departed from the American model, and placed many hurdles in the
debtor’s way to full discharge.169 The German word for the six-year
period is Wohlverhaltensperiode, which literally translates to “good
behavior period.”170 This reveals the hidden legislative intent beneath
the surface of this law; namely, the desire to re-socialize the debtor and
allow her to reenter the market as a contributing member.171 By
imposing a six-year hiatus, the German system forces debtors to reflect
159.
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and take control over their financial lives, negotiate with creditors, and
maintain working status in order to reach a fair outcome for all
parties.172
While the stigma attached to bankruptcy has not eroded, Germany
experienced a period of increase in annual filings for personal
bankruptcy.173 From 1999 to 2007, the number of personal bankruptcies
in Germany exploded from 1,634 to 103,085.174 Despite the rise in
filings, however, the German insolvency law has turned Germany’s
insolvency system into a necessary evil rather than a convenient outlet
for over-indebted consumers.
Whether this law has succeeded in curbing the growth of overindebted consumers in Germany remains to be seen. In 2008,
bankruptcy filings there receded to 95,730, and this statistic has not
significantly changed since.175 The earlier rise in bankruptcy filings
between 1999 and 2007 may be explained by the introduction of debt
discharge in 1999.176 This policy opened the door to a great number of
over-stretched consumers yearning for relief.177 The German legislation,
however, by designing a harsh yet efficient treatment process, was able
to control the rising number of filings, which possibly reached its
equilibrium point by 2008.178 As of now, this explanation remains
speculation, and the question of whether this legislation effectively
prevents any further rise of filings in Germany still remains
unanswered. The rate of bankruptcy filings in Germany over time will
determine the success of this truly unique legislation.
D. Israel
1. Treatment: Rigid Approach Toward Over-Indebted Consumers
The Israeli bankruptcy system inherited the rigidity of the
traditional English insolvency system.179 Due to some cultural and legal

172. Id.
173. Gerhardt, supra note 97, at 9.
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175. Number of Insolvencies in Germany from 1950 to 2011, STATISTA (2012),
http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/4898/umfrage/anzahl-von-insolvenzen-indeutschland/.
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variations, however, it evolved quite differently.180 As other developed
nations liberalize their approach toward over-indebted individuals,
Israel’s liberalization is occurring at a much slower pace.181 In the
context of this article, Israel represents the most conservative
application of the fresh-start doctrine.
From its inception, the Israeli insolvency system has been defined
by an unforgiving and, at times, hostile attitude towards over-indebted
consumers.182 Legislators, judges and lawyers adopted this approach out
of fear that permissive discharge would lead to the financial instability
of Israel, which was a young, poor, and beleaguered country in the
1950s and 1960s.183 Until the mid-1990s, debtors could face
imprisonment—a decidedly heavy-handed approach—if they failed to
repay their loans.184 In the 1990s, Israel experienced an increase in
imprisonment orders issued against non-paying debtors, a statistic
which led to reform in 1996.185 The reform adopted a pro-debtor
approach, and favored the goals of the fresh-start doctrine.186 The legal
culture in Israel, however, has hindered the reception of the reform, and
its implementation.187 Currently, only one of the four districts in Israel,
the Jerusalem district, fully yields to the liberalizing provisions put forth
by the reform.188 This division has created an interesting reality in which
two opposing paradigms of consumer bankruptcy exist side by side,
creating a unique opportunity for comparison.
The Official Receiver’s Office is the most influential body in the
Israeli consumer bankruptcy system.189 It is a government agency that
conducts all insolvency cases in its district.190 The focus of the Official
Receiver’s Office is to find the reasons for the debtor’s financial
failure.191 This focus is guided by the perception that debtors whose
over-indebtedness is the result of reckless financial conduct are not

180. See Rafel Efrat, The Political Economy of Personal Bankruptcy in Israel, in CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 163–73 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen Ian Ramsey,
William Whitford eds., 2003) [hereinafter Efrat, Political Economy].
181. Id. at 181–82.
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183. Id. at 170–71.
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185. Efrat, Political Economy, supra note 180, at 167.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 176.
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worthy of discharge.192 Therefore, the Official Receiver’s Office spends
a good amount of time and effort in investigating the causes of debtors’
financial downfall.193 This harsh measure is particular to the Israeli
bankruptcy system,194 and often intrudes on debtors’ privacy, a result
running counter to the humanitarian purpose of the fresh-start
doctrine.195
Once the investigation is complete, and the debtor is deemed
honest, she is obligated to make monthly payments to creditors.196 The
amount to be paid is normally determined by the court,197 and the
various benefits and protections awarded by the bankruptcy system,
such as stay and discharge, are contingent upon the debtor’s
payments.198 Since courts are given great discretion in determining the
amount of monthly payments, the court’s considerations differ between
the pro-debtor district, where the amount is normally low, and the procreditor districts, where the amount is normally high.199 The pro-debtor
and liberalized district bases the amount of monthly payments on the
debtor’s ability to pay.200 In contrast, the pro-creditor districts base the
amount on the size of the debtor’s debts.201 In addition to requiring high
monthly payments, the pro-creditor districts mount bureaucratic hurdles,
such as a prolonged waiting period for the issuance of a commencement
order,202 which is required under court approval to begin the bankruptcy
proceeding.203 Prior to such issuance, the debtor cannot be declared
bankrupt and cannot enjoy the protections of the bankruptcy system.204
While the commencement order is issued within three weeks in the prodebtor district, the pro-creditor districts take as long as eighteen weeks
to produce this order.205 Debtors are also required to attend hearings in
the pro-creditor districts, whereas the pro-debtor district does not
require their presence.206 Ultimately, the inclination to give discharge is
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greater in the pro-debtor district, and lower in the pro-creditor
districts.207
Therefore, the treatment of consumer bankruptcy in Israel is far
from uniform as a result of the discrepancy between pro-debtor and procreditor districts. Recent findings indicate that Israel’s annual rate of
personal bankruptcy filings has surged by 2660 percent between 1995
and 2010, particularly in pro-creditor districts.208 The reason cited for
this surge in filings is the 2008 global economic crisis.209 Nevertheless,
the controlled low growth of bankruptcy filings in the pro-debtor district
might be an indication of future liberalizing reforms in Israel.210
2. Prevention: Slow and Cautious Liberalization as the Key
to Effective Prevention
In 1997, Israel had approximately 0.16 bankruptcies per 1,000
people.211 This statistic, in comparison with the United States (5
bankruptcies per one thousand people)212 and the United Kingdom (0.47
bankruptcies per one thousand people),213 would have been remarkable
if Israel’s bankruptcy laws were more open to discharge.214 While the
rate of growth of Israel’s consumer bankruptcy filings is still low, those
of the United States and the United Kingdom continue to climb
sharply.215 Israel’s strikingly low rate of bankruptcy filings can be linked
to its harsh, and often unforgiving, treatment of debtors.216
Israel’s policy tools for preventing the rise of bankruptcy filings,
however, are not limited to its grudgingly given discharge, or the costly
and unpleasant procedure imposed on relief-seeking debtors. Part of
Israel’s economic policy is also to employ stringent restrictions on
financial institutions, limiting the propensity of creditors to extend risky
207. Id.
208. Mark Sean, The Crisis by Numbers: A Sharp Rise in Bankruptcies in 2009, CALCALIST
(Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3390707,00.html; Mark Sean, A
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loans.217 Stigma also plays an important role in curbing the number of
people willing to resort to bankruptcy, which leads them to act with
financial responsibility.218
Based on these findings, it may be unjust to label Israel’s
bankruptcy system as resoundingly pro-creditor. Israel’s policies can be
described as cautious towards both debtors and creditor.219 Throughout
its short and precarious history, the Israeli legislature knowingly put a
heavy burden on both parties (with an admitted emphasis on debtors) in
an effort to prevent bankruptcy filings and over-indebtedness and the
inevitable financial instability.220 The Israeli approach is perhaps most
helpful in demonstrating that incentives do work.221 While the
implementation of the fresh-start doctrine in Israel is admittedly
lacking,222 it is possible that Israel’s careful and slow liberalization
might be the source of its success in steadily preventing bankruptcy
filings.
V. REALIGNING THE AMERICAN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM:
DEVISING A NEW APPROACH
Discharge of debt is the most radical form of treatment for overindebtedness.223 Even the National Bankruptcy Review Commission in
the United States, which holds a fairly pro-debtor approach to consumer
bankruptcy,224 concluded in its 1997 report that the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code’s permissive approach to discharge was flawed as originally
enacted.225 While the United States has long maintained a liberal
approach to discharge, the BAPCPA has led the American bankruptcy
system to the other extreme, and adopted a strongly pro-creditor
approach.226 With the passage of the BAPCPA, it is clear that Congress
rejects the permissive Chapter 7 approach to discharge.227 The
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alternative offered by the BAPCPA, however, fails to uphold the goals
of the fresh-start doctrine.228
The discussion above offers a rudimentary, albeit comprehensive,
review of the various tools with which consumer bankruptcy policies
were created in Europe and Israel. The following discussion will apply
these tools to the BAPCPA, and consider new possible approaches to
discharge of consumer debt in the United States.
A. Imposition of Out-of-Court Negotiations
In reforming the American bankruptcy system, one must consider
installing forceful policies that would encourage debtors and creditors to
settle out of court. Such policies, which are pervasive in the three
European countries examined, have proven a useful and amicable
replacement to the coercive bankruptcy process, and do not burden a
country’s judicial system since bankruptcy cases are kept out of court.229
The English IVA model may not be the best one to follow. Due to
its high cost, the IVA model exposes debtors to even greater
indebtedness and leaves them without recourse if they fail to comply
with the IVA repayment plan.230 Alternatively, the French insolvency
system offers more tailored relief to debtors. The French legislature’s
aversion to discharge and its decision to apply discharge only in
correlation to the size of indebtedness has given debtors and creditors an
opportunity to resolve their issues independently.231 As the parties fail to
reach a solution, a commission is gradually given more power to force
one upon them.232 The American Chapter 7 discharge model, which
offers a single quick discharge to all forms of debtors, maximizes the
loss creditors must suffer, and encourages debtors to act recklessly with
relative impunity.233 Further, the Chapter 7 approach to discharge places
a great burden on the judicial system, funneling all cases to courts,
when some could reach out-of-court agreements. By making
distinctions between debtors based on the size of their indebtedness, the

228. Sen. Kerry on Bankruptcy Reform, AM. BANKR. INST. (Aug. 1, 2004),
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French insolvency system allows at least 80 percent of its bankruptcy
cases to be resolved through settlements.234
The French approach to out-of-court negotiations is largely defined
by the “Stick Behind the Door” system.235 As discussed above, this
system penalizes creditors who are unwilling to negotiate with a willing
debtor by granting the debtor some type of discharge.236 American
bankruptcy law does not have a similar provision. In fact, it actively
denounces distinctions between creditors under Chapter 13
bankruptcy.237
The one provision that seems to require some out-of-court
negotiation in U.S. Bankruptcy Code states that the court may reduce
the creditor’s claim if a creditor “refuses to negotiate a reasonable
alternative repayment schedule proposed on behalf of the debtor by an
approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency.”238 This
provision, however, loses its efficiency due to its own limitations. One
limitation is that the “reasonable alternative repayment schedule” must
have been made at least 60 days before the debtor’s bankruptcy filing;
once the creditor makes it clear that it will not settle out of court, the
debtor will immediately file for bankruptcy and not wait sixty days.239 A
second limitation is that the debtor must offer to pay at least 60 percent
of the payment to any one creditor within a “reasonable extension” of
the original contractual repayment period.240 Needless to say, many
debtors cannot afford to make such an offer.241 A third limitation is that
the maximum punishment to creditors is a 20 percent reduction of their
claim.242 This sanction is too low to deter creditors from refusing
alternative dispute resolution.243 Therefore, despite the apparent
inclusion of a “Stick Behind the Door” provision in the American
Bankruptcy Code, this aspect of the code remains toothless and
ineffective.244
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B. Adoption of a “Good Behavior Period” Approach to Discharge
The American bankruptcy system ought to heed the unique “good
behavior period” law of the German insolvency system. The “good
behavior period” maintains both goals of the fresh-start doctrine by
providing adequate relief to over-indebtedness, and attaches the risk of
loss to both debtors and creditors.245 The six-year period mandated by
German law can deter abusive conduct by making the process too
protracted for abuse to be worthwhile.246 In addition, the German law
wields a large “stick” over debtors in the form of the “good behavior”
requirement, which demands the debtor maintain a working status.247
With the promise of discharge at the end of the sixth year, debtors are
strongly incentivized to endure the six-year period or lose the
protections of the bankruptcy system by failing to comply with the
“good behavior” requirement.248
Enacting such a law in the United States would appease those who
advocated for the BAPCPA by imposing an arduous path on the way to
discharge, while at the same time upholding the goals of the fresh-start
doctrine, which the BAPCPA approach currently does not maintain.249
In addition, the focus of the German law is on debtors’ financial
accountability.250 This is what ultimately sets the German insolvency
system apart from that of the United States.251 While the BAPCPA did
much to eliminate free access to discharge, it did little to evoke a sense
of financial responsibility with consumers and encourage them to reflect
on the long-term goals of their financial lives.252 One of the useful byproducts of the German law is the creation of a six-year buffer between
the time of insolvency and the time of debtor’s re-socialization.253 It
offers debtors an opportunity to reflect on what went wrong and how
they can avoid insolvency in the future.254
However, the application of the “good behavior period” approach
in the United States is not without problems. Due to the United States’
modest social welfare system and its low wage exemptions, bankrupts
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have little support to help them through a “good behavior period.”255
With extensive welfare benefits and high wage exemptions, German
bankrupts enjoy firm support and are, therefore, more likely to endure
the protracted period than their American counterparts.256 The consistent
failures of many Chapter 13 repayment plans bolster this argument.257
C. Adoption of a “Third Way” Approach to Prevent Over-Indebtedness
The construction of an effective over-indebtedness prevention
policy cannot be confined to the bankruptcy system alone. The “Third
Way” envisions a consumer credit market in which both debtors and
creditors are sufficiently informed and motivated to take reasonable
risks and engage in responsible conduct.258 To promote this vision, the
English DTI created the so-called “Over-indebtedness Action Plan,”259
an effort to which future reformers ought to pay attention.
Preventative measures should not be limited to provisions and
incentives within the bankruptcy system, but should extend to the
various extraneous players who shape the consumer credit industry.260
The “Third Way” approach maintains that the task of preventing overindebtedness could go beyond mere incentives and actually set a
standard of conduct within the industry.261
A notable initiative by the British DTI is the introduction of a
mechanism to investigate interest rate ceilings, which is intended to
limit predatory loans extended to weak lenders.262 The 2008 subprime
crisis was defined by the practice of extending high interest loans to
risky debtors. Unscrupulous creditors generate large profit through this
practice while ignoring the fact that debtors will ultimately become
over-indebted.263
Such efforts to extraneously curb over-indebtedness should
coincide with the creation of limiting provisions within the bankruptcy
system.264 Such provisions could include, for instance, laws that refuse
to accommodate the interests of predatory creditors.265 In France, the
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insolvency laws require courts to view the interests of predatory lenders
in an unfavorable light.266 Currently, American bankruptcy laws do not
offer such a distinction between abusive and non-abusive creditors and,
in some cases, even proscribe it.267 Creating provisions that would
galvanize the parties to be responsible, concomitant with efforts to
influence extraneous players within the consumer credit industry, could
effectively curb the yearly rise in bankruptcy filings.268
One of the obstacles to undertaking such efforts in the United
States is the existence of a federalist system, in which the authority over
credit and debt regulation is divided between the state and federal
governments.269 A concentrated government effort to tackle overindebtedness by adopting the “Third Way” approach requires greater
control over the different players in the consumer credit market.270
Therefore, if such efforts are to be seriously implemented in the United
States, it must be done in concert between the states and the federal
government.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to comply with the goals of the fresh-start doctrine, the
American bankruptcy system should move away from the presumption
that most debtors intend to abuse the system. At the same time, while
debtors are not inherently abusive, the American bankruptcy system
should not return to the lax approach to discharge applied in the 1978
Bankruptcy Code. The realignment of the American bankruptcy system
with the goals of the fresh-start doctrine means that while debtors are
offered an opportunity to rejoin the consumer market, unencumbered by
debt, proper safeguards are put in place to accommodate the interests of
creditors as well. 271
Such safeguards should exist in both the treatment of existing, and
the prevention of future, over-indebtedness. As in France, most
solutions of existing over-indebtedness should be made outside of court,
and as part of a consensual and amicable settlement. It would benefit
both parties and the judicial system if debtors and creditors were
encouraged to resolve their issues without intervention.
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Where intervention in the bankruptcy system cannot be avoided,
such intervention should be need-based, and performed with care. If
parties do not need strong intervention, the bankruptcy system should
exercise only mild coercion that would help the parties obtain
compromise. Where compromise seems impossible, it would be prudent
to give full discharge.
Discharge is a privilege, so in order to avoid a perverse consumer
incentive to prefer extreme indebtedness in order to avoid repayment
and compromise, a “good behavior period” system should be enacted in
cases where full discharge is contemplated. By taking such measures,
discharge would become a necessary evil to debtors, who would not
rush to take risky loans. In addition, it would make creditors more
selective in extending loans to consumers.272
Furthermore, Congress should make sincere efforts to work with
the consumer credit industry to promote a standard of responsible
conduct. The combination of incentivizing provisions within the
bankruptcy system and cooperation between Congress and the
consumer credit industry will effectively prevent over-indebtedness.273
Such efforts should concentrate on curbing abuse, such as predatory
loans, that cannot be remedied through the bankruptcy system alone.
Finally, the process of reforming the American bankruptcy system
must not occur overnight. The Israeli insolvency system is a useful
example in understanding the transition from a conservative to liberal
bankruptcy system. While Israel’s transition is not complete and is not
defined by efficiency, it provides financial stability to a country that
suffers from regional geo-political instability.274 This gradual
liberalization is also evident in the French insolvency system, which
liberalized based on the need to offer debtors greater relief.275 In such
precarious times, the American economy requires stability, and the
lesson to be taken from the French and Israeli experiences is that any
reform to the American bankruptcy system should not occur
immediately, but over time.
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